In this paper we analyze Tendermint proposed in [7] , one of the most popular blockchains based on PBFT Consensus. The current paper dissects Tendermint under various system communication models and Byzantine adversaries. Our methodology consists in identifying the algorithmic principles of Tendermint necessary for a specific combination of communication model -adversary. This methodology allowed to identify bugs [3] in preliminary versions of the protocol ([19], [7]) and to prove its correctness under the most adversarial conditions: an eventually synchronous communication model and asymmetric Byzantine faults.
Introduction
In the Blockchain systems area the recent tendency is to privilege solutions based on distributed agreement than proof-of-work. This is motivated by the fact that the majority of proof-of-work based solutions such as Bitcoin or Ethereum are energetically not viable when the economical efficiency is targeted. Moreover, proof-of-work solutions guarantee only with high probability the existence of an unique chain, the major drawback for using blockchains in industrial applications. That is, forks even though they are rare do still happen with a dramatic impact on the consistency guarantees offered by the system. Therefore, alternatives to proof-of-work have been recently considered. Interestingly, the research in blockchain systems revived a branch of distributed systems research: Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols having PBFT consensus protocol as ambassador. In the class of blockchains based on distributed agreement, Tendermint (inspired by PBFT consensus) is one of the most popular.
The Blockchain is a distributed ledger implementing an append-only list of blocks chained to each other, it serves as an immutable and non repudiable ledger in a system composed of untrusted components. These characteristics are a fruitful field to envision new industrial applications. Those applications, by their nature, demand strong consistency quality of services from the underlying data structure, the blockchain. Consensus algorithms provide strong consistency for free. Since Blockchain is a list, the append operation needs to preserve the chain shape of the data structure, leading to the necessity to have a mechanism allowing untrusted processes to agree on the next block to append. Bitcoin Blockchain, the most famous Blockchain, employs the proof-of-work mechanism [13] . That is, processes willing to append a new block have to solve a crypto-puzzle. The winning process will proceed appending the new block. While this mechanism does not require a real coordination between the processes participating to the Bitcoin system, it might lead to 1 inconsistencies. Indeed, if more than one process solves the crypto-puzzle to extend the same block, then the chain shape is lost as long as the conflict is unsolved. In [4] , the authors proved that the only way to avoid forks is to employ a consensus mechanism.
Consensus [20] is a fundamental problem in the distributed system area, which allows coordination among processes. It can be informally described as follows: given a set of processes proposing a value (which differs from process to process) then, after a finite amount of time, all processes agree on the same value, chosen among the proposed ones.
The Byzantine Agreement problem, as proved in [20] , cannot be solved with less than 3f + 1 processes in a synchronous message-passing system (where the message delivery delay is upper bounded) in the presence of f Byzantine processes and in an asynchronous message-passing system (when there are no upper bounds on the message delivery delay) in the presence of one faulty (crash) process, as proved in the seminal FLP paper [15] . In between those impossibility results, few years later, Dwork et al. [12] proved that considering an eventual synchronous message-passing system (there is a time after which there is an upper bound on the message delivery delay) it is possible to solve Consensus even in presence of Byzantine faults. Finally, Castro and Liskov proposed the PBFT [8] , which optimizes the performances of the previous solution. The eventual synchronous message-passing system in presence of Byzantine faults is the model considered nowadays in implementing blockchain. There exist different BFT based blockchain propositions (e.g., [1] [17] [11] based on PBFT) and real implementations as Hyperledger [5] based on BFT-SMaRt [22] , Tendermint [24] based on a variation of PBFT and RedBelly based on DBFT Consensus algorithm [10] .
In this paper we analyze Tendermint proposed in [7] as one of the most promising but not fully analyzed protocols so far. Tendermint targets an eventual synchronous system [12] , which means that safety has to be guaranteed in the asynchronous periods and liveness in synchronous ones, when a subset of processes can be affected by Byzantine failures. To analyze the protocol, we dissect Tendermint identifying the techniques used to address different challenges due to the system model or the power of the adversary. We consider the following system models, from the strongest to the weakest: synchronous round-based model in presence of symmetric Byzantine faults (i.e., an adversary such that its behaviour is perceived identically by all non-faulty processes); synchronous round-based model in presence of asymmetric Byzantine faults (i.e., its behavior may be perceived differently by different non-faulty processes); and finally eventual synchronous communication model in presence of asymmetric Byzantine faults. For each type of model we provide the corresponding algorithm (a variant of Tendermint [7] ). Finally, we provide a proved correct protocol specification of [7] in the eventual synchronous setting in presence of asymmetric Byzantine faults and computed its complexity. This methodology allowed to identify bugs [3] in the preliminary versions of the protocol ( [19] , [7] ) that now have been solved.
Model
The system is composed of an infinite set Π of asynchronous sequential processes, namely Π = {p 1 , . . . }; i is called the index of p i . Asynchronous means that each process proceeds at it own speed, which can vary with time and remains unknown to the other processes. Sequential means that a process executes one step at a time. This does not prevent it from executing several threads with an appropriate multiplexing. As local processing time are negligible with respect to message transfer delays, they are considered as being equal to zero.
Arrival model. We assume a finite arrival model [2] , i.e. the system has infinitely many processes but each run has only finitely many. The size of the set Π ρ ⊂ Π of processes that participate in each system run is not a priori-known. We also consider a finite subset V ⊆ Π ρ of validators. The set V may change during any system run and its size n is a-priori known. A process is promoted in V based on a so-called merit parameter, which can model for instance its stake in proof-of-stake blockchains. Note that in the current Tendermint implementation, it is a separate module included in the Cosmos project [18] that is in charge of implementing the selection of V .
Communication network. The processes communicate by exchanging messages through an eventually synchronous network [12] . Eventually Synchronous means that after a finite unknown time τ there is a bound δ on the message transfer delay.
Failure model. There is no bound on processes that can exhibit a Byzantine behaviour [21] in the system, but up to f validators can exhibit a Byzantine behaviour at each point of the execution. A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily. A process (or validator) that exhibits a Byzantine behaviour is called faulty. Otherwise, it is non-faulty or correct or honest. To be able to solve the consensus problem, we assume that f < n/3.
In [16] , different categories of faults have been considered, in particular we consider symmetric and asymmetric: a process p i is said to be symmetrically faulty if its behaviour is perceived identically by all non-faulty processes; and a process p i is said to be asymmetrically faulty if its behaviour may be perceived differently by different non-faulty processes. In this work, we called the processes symmetrically faulty, the symmetric Byzantine, and we called the asymmetrically faulty the asymmetric Byzantine or just Byzantine.
Communication primitives. In the following we assume the presence of a broadcast primitive. A process p i by invoking the primitive broadcast( T AG, m ) broadcasts a message, where T AG is the type of the message, and m its content. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a process can send messages to itself. The primitive broadcast() is a best effort broadcast, which means that when a correct process broadcasts a value, eventually all the correct processes deliver it. A process p i receives a message by executing the primitive delivery(). Messages are created with a digital signature, and we assume that digital signatures cannot be forged. When a process p i delivers a message, it knows the process p j that created the message.
Let us note that the assumed broadcast primitive in an open dynamic network can be implemented through gossiping, i.e. each process sends the message to current neighbors in the underlying dynamic network graph. In these settings the finite arrival model is a necessary condition for the system to show eventual synchrony. Intuitively, a finite arrival implies that message losses due to topology changes are bounded, so that the propagation delay of a message between two processes not directly connected can be bounded [6] .
Round-based Execution model. We assume that each correct process evolves in rounds. A round consists of three phases, in order : (i) a Send phase, where the process broadcasts messages computed during the last round, or a default messages for the first round; (ii) a Delivery phase where the process collect messages sent during the current and previous rounds; and (iii) a Compute phase where the process uses the messages delivered to change its state. At the end of a round a process exit from the current round and starts the next round. Each round last a certain duration, we consider the Send and the Compute phase as being atomic, they are executed instantaneously, but not the Delivery phase. In a synchronous network, we assume the the duration of the Delivery phase, and so of the round is δ. In an eventually synchronous network, the duration of a round is monotonically increasing, it is modified each time the process does not deliver "enough" messages, for instance a majority of correct responses.
Problem definition. In this paper we analyze the correctness of the Tendermint protocol against the Consensus abstraction in distributed systems. We say that an algorithm implements Consensus if and only if it satisfies the following properties: Termination, every correct process eventually decides some value; Integrity, no correct process decides twice; Agreement, if there is a correct process that decides a value v, then eventually all the correct processes decide v; Validity [9] , a decided value is valid, it satisfies the predefined predicate denoted valid().
Tendermint Algorithms
Tendermint BFT Consensus protocol [19, 24, 7] is a variant of PBFT consensus that aims at being the core layer under the Tendermint blockchain.
In this work, we dissect the Tendermint protocol. We present it in three different models, from the strongest to the weakest: (i) synchronous communication in presence of Symmetric Byzantine processes; (ii) synchronous communication in presence of Asymmetric Byzantine processes and; (iii) Eventually Synchronous communication in presence of Asymmetric Byzantine processes. We show the modifications the algorithm needs to work from (i) to the model (ii) and finally to the model (iii).
The three Tendermint protocols share a common algorithmic structure, they proceed in epochs, and each epoch consists in three rounds: (i) the PRE-PROPOSE round where the proposer of the epoch broadcasts a value, (ii) the PROPOSE round, where each process accept and broadcast the pre-proposal or nil otherwise, and the (iii) VOTE round, where processes broadcast the value they are voting on according the the proposal they receive.
When p i broadcasts a message T AG, h, e, m , m contains a value, we say that p i pre-proposes, proposes or votes m if T AG=PRE-PROPOSE, T AG=PROPOSE or T AG=VOTE respectively. When p i broadcasts PRE-PROPOSE, h, e, m, e ′ , where e ′ is an epoch we also say that p i pre-proposes m with an epoch e ′ .
For each epoch, there is a process that is called the proposer for the epoch which should prepropose. Messages syntax, variables and data structures. h p is an integer representing the consensus instance the process is currently executing. e p is an integer representing the epoch where the process p is, we note that for each height, a process may have multiple epochs. decision p is a table that contains the sequence of decisions, decision p [h] is the decision of process p for the consensus instance h. proposal p is the value the process p proposes. vote p is the value the process p votes. Functions. We denote as Block the set containing all blocks, and as M emP ool the data structure containing all the transactions.
proposer : Height × Epoch → Π is a deterministic function which gives the proposer for a given epoch at a given height in a round robin fashion.
valid : V alue → Bool is an application dependent predicate that is satisfied if the given value is valid. If there is a value v such that valid(v) = true, we say that v is valid. Note that we set valid(nil) = false.
-getValue : V oid → V alue is an application dependent predicate which gives a valid value.
id : V alue → Hash application that gives a unique identifier to a value. In the current version of Tendermint, the hash of the value represents its identifier, such that instead of sending a whole value an identifier is sent to optimize the communication cost.
-sendByProposer : Height × Epoch × V alue → Bool is an predicate that gives true if the given value has been pre-proposed by the proposer of the given height during the given epoch. The data structures above are shared by all three algorithms. In each section we specify the data structures relative to a specific version of the algorithm. if proposer(hp, ep) = p then 10:
broadcast PRE − PROPOSE, hp, ep, proposalp to all processes 11:
Delivery phase: 12:
delivery PRE − PROPOSE, hp, ep, v from proposer(hp, ep) 13:
Compute phase: 14:
if valid(v) then 15:
proposalp If a process p delivers the pre-proposal from the proposer of the epoch, p sets its proposal to the pre-proposal, otherwise it sets it to nil.
Round PROPOSE (lines 18 -27):
During the PROPOSE round, each process broadcasts its proposal, and collects the proposals sent by the other processes. After the Delivery phase of the round propose, each process has a set of proposals, and process p sets the variable vote p to the value returned by the deterministic function select on the set of proposals delivered.
3. Round VOTE (lines 28 -39): In the round VOTE, correct process q votes vote q . q collects all the votes that were broadcast, then it checks if the value returned by the function select let us say v is valid. If v is valid, then q decides v, otherwise it increases the epoch number and goes to the PRE-PROPOSE round.
Let us stress that such algorithm is only pedagogical. Indeed, in such system model at the end of each round all the correct processes share the same set of messages delivered and solving consensus became trivial. The first round PRE-PROPOSE just forces the processes on the value they PROPOSE after. Then, there are the classical two rounds to exchange the values among processes before taking a decision. Notice that in this case, even in presence of a faulty proposer, if there is at least one valid value in the final set at the end of the epoch, then correct processes decide.
Byzantine Synchronous System This section presents the algorithm that solves Consensus in a synchronous model in presence of asymmetric behaviour from Byzantine processes. Byzantine processes can send different messages to different processes, in other words, at the end of an epoch different correct processes can have different messages delivered, which can harm the safety condition, i.e., some correct processes might decide and some do not. Then, information from one epoch have to be kept for the next ones. That is why, along with a new function, we need for two more variables. Functions. 2f +1 : P ROP OSE * ∪V OT E * → Bool: checks if there is at least 2f +1 proposals/vote in the given set. Messages syntax, variables and data structures. (i) lockedV alue stores a value which is potentially will be decided. If process p delivered more than 2f + 1 proposes for the same value v during its PROPOSE round, it sets its lockedV alue p to v, (ii) validV alue stores a value which is potentially will be decided. If the process p delivered at least 2f + 1 proposes for the same value v whether during its PROPOSE round or its VOTE round, it sets its validV alue to v. validV alid is the last value that a process delivered at least 2f + 1 times, and can be different than lockedV alue.
Those variables are used to ensure the Agreement condition. Byzantine processes can send different information to different processes then some correct processes (but not all) may deliver 2f + 1 occurrences for the same value. Therefore such value can be a potential decided value for some correct process p. To prevent the violation of the agreement property, there is a need to keep track locally of such value. Such that if p is the next proposer pre-proposes such value. Otherwise p checks the new pre-proposal against such value. Detailed description of the algorithm. In Algorithm 2 we describe the algorithm to solve the Consensus as defined in Section 2 in a synchronous system, and where Byzantine processes can exhibit even asymmetric behaviour. The algorithm proceeds in 3 rounds for any given epoch e at height h: validV aluep := nil 7:
proposalp := getV alue() 8:
votep := nil 9: Round PRE-PROPOSE(ep) : 10:
Send phase: 11:
if proposer(hp, ep) = p then 12:
broadcast PRE − PROPOSE, hp, ep, proposalp to all processes 13:
Delivery phase: 14:
delivery PRE − PROPOSE, hp, ep, v from proposer(hp, ep) 15:
Compute phase:
16:
if valid(v) ∧ validV aluep = nil then 17:
proposalp ← id(v) 18:
proposalp ← nil 21:
else 22:
proposalp ← id(v)
23:
Round PROPOSE(ep) :
24:
Send phase: 25:
broadcast PROPOSE, hp, ep, proposalp to all processes 26:
Delivery phase: 27:
delivery PROPOSE, hp, ep, * from all processes 28:
Compute phase: If a process q delivers the pre-proposal from the proposer of the epoch, q checks the validity of the pre-proposal with respect to its state, and if the pre-proposal is valid, q sets its proposal proposal q to the pre-proposal, otherwise it sets it to nil.
Round PROPOSE (lines 23 -34):
During the PROPOSE round, each process broadcasts its proposal, and collects the proposals sent by the other processes. After the Delivery phase of the round propose, process p has a set of proposals, and checks if a value v, pre-proposed by the proposer, was proposed by at least 2f + 1 different processes, if it is the case, and the value is valid, then p sets vote p , validV alue and lockedV alue to v, otherwise it sets vote p to nil. if validV aluep = nil then 62:
Round VOTE
proposalp ← validV aluep 63: else 64:
proposalp ← getV alue() Byzantine Eventual Synchronous System Using the formalism in Section 2, we present the Tendermint BFT Consensus algorithm [7] in an eventual synchronous setting, where Byzantine processes may exhibit an asymmetric behaviour. To achieve the consensus in this setting two additional variables need to be used, (i) lockedEpoch p is an integer representing the last epoch where process p updated its lockedV alue, and (ii) validEpoch p is an integer which represents the last epoch where process p updates validV alue p .
These two new variables are used to guarantee the agreement property during the asynchronous period. During such period different epochs may overlap at different processes, then it is needed to keep track of the relative epoch when a process locks in order to not accept "outdated" information, i.e., generated during a previous epoch.
Detailed description of the algorithm.
In Algorithm 3 we describe the algorithm to solve the Consensus as defined in Section 2 in an eventually synchronous system, and where Byzantine processes can exhibit asymmetric behaviour. This algorithm has been reported in [7] with the bugs fixed in [23] . The algorithm proceeds in 3 rounds for any given epoch e at height h:
1. Round PRE-PROPOSE (lines 9 -25): The description of this round is the same as in the round-based case with asymmetric Byzantine. We highlight the fact that a "valid" for a correct process p with respect to the state in the eventual synchronous case is different than in the round-base case, since the variable lockedEpoch p is now taken into account.
Round PROPOSE (lines 26 -42):
The difference with the Algorithm 2 is that: when a correct process p updates lockedV alue p (resp. validV alue p ), it also update lockedEpoch p (resp. validEpoch p ) to the current epoch. We recall that for the evental synchronous setting, each process has a time-out for each round. If during a round process p does not deliver at least 2f + 1 messages sent during that round (or the pre-proposal for the PRE-PROPOSE round), the corresponding time-out is increased.
Complexity. In the worst case scenario, the algorithm terminates when a pre-proposal can be proposed by more than 2f + 1 correct processes, which eventually happens due to the round robin selection function. Thus, during the synchrony period, the protocol terminates in at most 2f epochs, while the optimum is f [14] . At each epoch, all processes broadcast messages, it follows that during one epoch the protocol uses O(n 2 ) messages, then in the worst case scenario the message complexity is O(f n 2 ).
Correctness Proof of Tendermint Algorithm in a Byzantine Eventual Synchronous
Setting In this section, we prove the correctness of Algorithm 3 (Tendermint) in an eventual synchronous system. We recall that there are 3f + 1 processes, and less than f Byzantine processes in the system.
Lemma 1 (Validity)
In an eventual synchronous system, Tendermint verifies the following property: A decided value satisfies the predefined predicate denoted as valid().
Proof The proof follows by construction. When a correct process decides a value (line 56), it checks before if that value is valid (line 55). So a correct process only decides a valid value. Lemma Proof We prove this lemma by contradiction. Let v, v ′ such that v = v ′ . Since there are 3f + 1 processes in the system, if v or v ′ gets at least 2f + 1 proposals (resp. votes), it means that at least f + 1 processes propose (vote) for both v and v ′ . By assumption there are less than f Byzantine in the system, at least 1 correct process proposes (votes) both for v and v ′ , which contradicts Lemma 3. It means that two different values cannot be proposed (resp. voted) at least 2f + 1 times during the same epoch. • Induction: Let a ≥ 1, we assume that ∀p ∈ L v,e , lockedV alue p = v at the end of each epoch between e and e + a, we also assume that if a value was proposed at least 2f + 1 times during these epochs it was either v or nil. We prove that at the end of epoch e + a + 1, no correct process q will have lockedV alue q = v ′ ∧ lockedEpoch q = e + a + 1 with (v ′ = v).
Let p ∈ L v,e , p delivers a pre-proposal for v, then p will set proposal p to v, and will propose v since lockedV alue p = v (lines 19 -25 & 28) , in any other case, if p does not deliver a pre-proposal, or delivers a pre-proposal for a value v ′ = v, it will set proposal p to nil and will propose nil (lines 19 -25 & 28) , since valid(nil) = false and by assumption, there is no e ′ ∈ {e, . . . , e + a} where there were at least 2f + 1 proposals for a value v ′ = v, and lockedEpoch p ≥ e. All processes in L v,e will then propose v or nil during epoch e + a + 1. We proved that if |L v,e | ≥ f +1, no correct process p will have lockedV alue p = v∧lockedEpoch p ≥ e, moreover a process in L v,e only proposes v or nil for each epoch e ′ > e. Lemma 
5
Lemma 6 (Agreement) In an eventual synchronous system, Tendermint verifies the following property: If there is a correct process that decides a value v, then eventually all the correct processes decide v.
Proof Let p be a correct process. We assume that p is the first correct process that decides, and we assume that it decides value v during epoch e. To decide, p delivered at least 2f + 1 votes for v for epoch e. Since there are less that f Byzantine processes, and by Lemma 3 correct processes can only vote once per epoch, so at least f + 1 correct processes voted for v during epoch e, so we have |L v,e | = |{q : q correct ∧ lockedV alue q = v ∧ lockedEpoch q = e at the end of epoch e}| ≥ f + 1. By Lemma 5 processes in L v,e only propose v or nil during each epoch after e, and no correct process q will have lockedV alue p = v ∧ lockedEpoch p ≥ e. Thanks to the best effort broadcast guarantees, all correct processes will eventually deliver the 2f + 1 votes for v from epoch e.
If a correct process q does not decide before delivering these votes, when delivering them, it will decide v (lines 55 -56). Otherwise, it means that q decides before delivering the votes from epoch e.
By contradiction, we assume that q decides a value v ′ = v during an epoch e ′ > e, so q delivered at least 2f + 1 votes for v ′ during epoch e ′ (lines 55 -56). Since a correct process only votes once by Lemma 3, there are less that f Byzantine processes and the messages are unforgeable, at least f + 1 correct processes vote for v ′ . A correct process votes a non-nil value if that value was proposed at least 2f + 1 times during the current epoch (lines 35 -45). By Lemma 3 a correct process only proposes once, there are less that f Byzantine processes and the messages are unforgeable, so at least f + 1 correct processes proposed v ′ during e ′ . Since e ′ > e and |L v,e | ≥ f + 1, by Lemma 5 there are at least f + 1 processes that propose v or nil during epoch e ′ . Even if all the 2f processes remaining proposes v ′ , there cannot be 2f +1 proposals for v ′ , which is a contradiction. So q cannot decide v ′ = v after epoch e and we assume that e is the first epoch where a correct process decides. Lemma 
6
Lemma 7 In an eventual synchronous system, if there is an epoch after which when a correct process broadcasts a message during a round r, it is delivered by all correct processes during the same round r, Tendermint verifies the following property: If a correct process p updates lockedV alue p to a value v during epoch e, then at the end of the epoch e, all correct processes have validV alue = v and validEpoch = e.
Proof We prove this lemma by construction.
Let e be the epoch after which when a correct process broadcasts a message during a round r, it is delivered by all correct processes during the same round r. Let p be a correct process, we assume that at the end of epoch e ′ ≥ e, p has lockedV alue p = v and lockedEpoch p = e ′ , it means that p delivered at least 2f + 1 proposals for v during epoch e ′ (lines 35 -37). When p votes, it sends all proposals delivered during PROPOSE round (line 45), and all the correct processes will deliver these proposals for v. Let q be a correct process, since q will deliver at least 2f + 1 proposals for v and epoch e ′ during the VOTE round, it will set validV alue q = v and validEpoch q = e ′ (lines 52 -54).
Lemma 7
Lemma 8 (Termination) In an eventual synchronous system, Tendermint verifies the following property: Every correct process eventually decides some value.
Proof By construction, if a correct process does not deliver more than 2f + 1 messages (or 1 from the proposesr in the PRE-PROPOSE round) from different processes during the corresponding round, it increases the duration of its rounds, so eventually during the synchronous period of the system all the correct processes will deliver the pre-proposal, proposals and votes from correct processes respectively during the PRE-PROPOSE, PROPOSE and the VOTE round. Let e be the first epoch after that time. If a correct process decides before e, by Lemma 6 all correct processes decide which ends the proof. Otherwise at the beginning of epoch e, no correct process decides yet. Let p be the proposer of e. We assume that p is correct and pre-propose v, v is valid since getV alue() always return a valid value (lines 7, 64), and validV alue p is always valid (lines 35 & 52). We have 2 cases:
• Case 1: At the beginning of epoch e, |{q : q correct ∧ (lockedEpoch q ≤ validEpoch p ∨ lockedV alue q = v)}| ≥ 2f + 1.
Let q be a correct process such that lockedEpoch q ≤ validEpoch p ∨ lockedV alue q = v, after the delivery of the pre-proposal v from p, q will update proposal q to v (lines 19 -25) . During the PROPOSE round, q proposes v (line 28), and since there are at least 2f +1 similar correct processes they will all propose v, and all correct processes will deliver at least 2f + 1 proposals for v (line 30).
Correct processes will set vote to v (lines 35 -28), will vote v, and will deliver these votes, so at least 2f + 1 of votes (lines 45 & 47). Since we assume that no correct processes decide yet, and since they deliver at least 2f + 1 votes for v, they will decide v (lines 55 -56).
• Case 2: At the beginning of epoch e, |{q : q correct ∧ (lockedEpoch q ≤ validEpoch p ∨ lockedV alue q = v)}| < 2f + 1.
Let q be a correct process such that lockedEpoch q > validEpoch p ∧ lockedV alue q = v, when p will make the pre-proposal, q will set proposal q to nil (line 23) and will propose nil (line 28).
By counting only the propose value of the correct processes, no value will have at least 2f + 1 proposals for v. There are two cases:
-No correct process delivers at least 2f + 1 proposals for v during the PROPOSE round, so they will all set their vote to nil, vote nil and go to the next epoch without changing their state (lines 42 & 45 -47 & 59 -64).
-If there are some correct processes that delivers at least 2f + 1 proposals for v during the PROPOSE round, which means that some Byzantine processes send proposals for v to those processes. As in the previous case, they will vote for v, and since there are 2f + 1 of them, all correct processes will decide v. Otherwise, there are less than 2f + 1 correct processes that deliver at least 2f + 1 proposals for v. Only them will vote for v (line 45). Without Byzantine processes, there will be less than 2f + 1 vote for v, no correct process will decide (lines 55 -58) and they will go to the next epoch, if Byzantine processes send votes for v to a correct process such as it delivers at least 2f + 1 votes for v during VOTE round, then it will decide (lines 55 -56), and by Lemma 6 all correct processes will eventually decide. Let q 1 be one of the correct processes that delivers at least 2f + 1 proposals for v during PROPOSE round, it means that at lockedV alue q 1 = v and lockedEpoch q 1 = e, by Lemma 7 at the end of epoch e, all correct processes will have validV alue = v validEpoch = e.
If there is no decision, either no correct process changes its state, otherwise all correct processes change their state and have the same validV alue and validRound, eventually a proposer of an epoch will satisfy the case 1, and that ends the proof.
If p the proposer of epoch e is Byzantine and more than 2f + 1 correct processes delivered the same message during PRE-PROPOSE round, and the pre-proposal is valid, the situation is like p was correct. Otherwise, there are not enough correct processes that delivered the pre-proposal, or if the pre-proposal is not valid, then there will be less than 2f + 1 correct processes that will propose that value, which is similar to the case 2.
Since the proposer is selected in a round robin fashion, a correct process will eventually be the proposer, and a correct process will decide. Lemma 8
Theorem 1 In an eventual synchronous system, Tendermint implements the Consensus.
Proof The proof follows directly from Lemmas 1, 2, 6 and 8.
T heorem 1
Conclusion
The contribution of this work is twofold. First, it analyzes the Tendermint consensus protocol and provides detailed proof of its correctness. Second, it dissects such protocol to link all the algorithmic techniques employed to the system model to cope with. We believe that this methodology can contribute in making consensus algorithms more understandable for developers and practitioners.
